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The value of studying a phenomenon at multiple levels of analysis is often emphasized in
psychology, but a lack of clarity about the nature of levels and the relations among them
remains an impediment to progress. The suggestion here is that an approach combining
the tenets of embodiment with the construct of the developmental system provides a way
forward. Embodiment opposes the splitting off and elevation of a level of mechanisms
that has characterized much of cognitive science. In contrast, a constructivist embodied
approach places a level of mechanisms in the context of a formal or systems level
of analysis, with developmental process framing the interpenetrating relations between
levels. Such an approach stems from a relational worldview that opposes conceptual splits
and posits that levels of structure and process comprise an indissociable complementarity.
The combination of embodiment and developmental systems within a relational worldview
is discussed and elaborated through outlining the integrative approach of relational
developmental systems, which has been proposed as a scientific paradigm within which
formulations of the interrelations among brain, body, and mind can be advanced.
Keywords: levels of explanation, developmental systems, multilevel analysis, philosophy, developmental
psychology
The value of explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis has
become an important emphasis in psychological science, yet a
coherent framework for explicating such levels and the relations
among them remains elusive.Within the field of cognitive science,
one influential attempt to conceptualize different levels of analy-
sis was put forward by the vision scientist David Marr (1982). In
line with the computational emphasis that characterized cogni-
tive science at the time he was writing, Marr’s account concerned
three levels “at which any machine carrying out an information
processing task must be understood” (Marr, 1982, p. 25). The
first level, whichMarr called the computational level, concerns the
general nature of the problem or task at hand. At the second level
of representation and algorithm, a sequence of operations and a
representational format is specified that would solve the problem
specified at the first level. At the third level of implementation,
the question is how that particular solution could be realized on
a machine (i.e., a description of the physical hardware needed).
There are similarities between Marr’s account and other levels-
based proposals from the same era (e.g., Simon, 1969; Dennett,
1971; Wimsatt, 1976), but his model has remained particularly
influential. However, on closer examination, two particular issues
constrain the utility of this basic framework (see also Marshall,
2013, in press).
First, psychological science has often been characterized by a
tendency to emphasize the explanatory priority of one level over
another. For example, it could be argued that cognitive science
has historically been too concerned with Marr’s second level of
representation and algorithm, or the level of problem-solving in
terms of what symbols are needed for a solution, and the rules
under which those symbols can be manipulated. This emphasis
can be partly traced to the influence of the idea that cognition
consists of formal computational reasoning processes acting on
the syntactic, but not the semantic, aspects of symbolic represen-
tations (Fodor, 1975). This cognitivist approach was associated
with an alignment of cognitive psychology with the emerging
discipline of artificial intelligence, which further contributed to
the dominance of an information processing view of the mind
(Newell et al., 1958). From this perspective, cognitive operations
could be seen as manipulations of sub-personal representations to
which meaning had been pre-assigned (for a recent critique, see
Allen and Bickhard, 2013). It has been argued in various places
that the move toward cognitivism, with its associated empha-
sis on Marr’s second level, was fundamentally a wrong turn in
that it prevented the emergence of more integrative accounts
of mental life (see Bruner, 1990; Thompson, 2007; Rowlands,
2010).
Second, psychology as a discipline has not arrived at a clear
formulation of how to conceptualize the relations between levels.
Indeed, it could be argued that the lack of a coherent explana-
tory framework for understanding the relations between different
levels is one of the biggest obstacles to progress in the disci-
pline. This problem can be partly traced to an emphasis within
cognitive science on the relative autonomy of each of Marr’s lev-
els, which in turn stemmed from the proposal that a given task
or problem could be solved in a myriad of ways, using differ-
ent representational systems or forms of physical implementation
(Fodor, 1975; Putnam, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984). While this notion
of multiple realization appears to avoid the problem of causal
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reductionism (Miller, 2010), it sidesteps the crucial question of
how to conceptualize the relations among levels.
Given the lack of coherence concerning the nature of levels
and the relations among them, how are we to move forward?
The suggestion here is that a framework that recognizes the inter-
penetrating nature of the relations between levels, and in which
considerations of development play a key role, is a way forward.
More specifically, it is argued that a relational developmental sys-
tems approach (Overton, 2013), in which the interconnections
among levels can be articulated within the context of embodiment,
provides a route toward a truly integrative account.
EMBODIMENT
Embodied approaches have become increasingly visible in psy-
chology over the past three decades (e.g., Varela et al., 1991;
Damasio, 1994; Glenberg, 1997; Clark, 1998; Anderson, 2003;
Wheeler, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Barsalou, 2008; Beer, 2008;
Overton, 2008; Semin and Smith, 2008; Menary, 2010). Although
there are clearly different theoretical and empirical strands of
embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002; Kiverstein, 2012), to a greater
or lesser extent they all challenge the isolated computational
mind of cognitivism, which lacks a brain, a body and a culture
(Edelman, 1992).
By locating the brain in the body of an active, agentive organ-
ism, embodiment threatens the clear distinctions between per-
ception (input), cognition (information processing) and action
(the execution of instructions or output) that underpin the cog-
nitivist account. One key tenet of embodied approaches is that
cognition can no longer be packaged into an isolated level of
information processing, or Marr’s second level of representa-
tion and algorithm. As noted by Clark (2000), “our notions of
what top-level task needs to be performed, and what kinds of
algorithms are adequate to perform it, are deeply informed by
reflection of details of bodily implementation, current needs, and
action-taking potential” (p. 96). As such, embodiment puts pres-
sure on a tidy separation of levels (or the isolation of any one
level), and the need to understand the relational ties among levels
moves to the fore.
Embodiment places the organism as an active agent that is
tightly interconnected with its environment, with the actions
of the individual constantly modifying these interconnections, a
process that in turn influences subsequent actions. In one par-
ticular theoretical approach to embodiment, this feedback loop
is the foundation of a dynamic system in which the boundaries
between individual and environment cannot be clearly deter-
mined (Stewart et al., 2010). In turn, this proposal brings with
it some far-reaching suggestions. Specifically, advocates of what
Chemero (2009) terms radical embodied cognitive science sug-
gest that the dynamic coupling of organism and environment
has two related implications for framing the study of mental life
(see also Hutto and Myin, 2012). First, that cognitive processes
are distributed across the dynamic system that results from the
non-linear coupling of individual and environment. Second, that
the formulation of the wider cognitive system as a dynamic sys-
tem challenges the need to invoke the concept of representation
in accounts of mental life (Silberstein and Chemero, 2012). This
challenge is partly founded in the work of Gibson (1979), who
proposed that preexisting environmental structure largely negates
the need for the concept of mental representation as it is usually
understood.
In line with these points, empirical work from the radical
embodied perspective often draws on dynamical systems theory
as a basis for modeling the coupling of an agent’s behavior over
time with the changing state of the environment. However, it
would be misleading and potentially damaging if an embodied
approach was equated with one particular flavor of dynamic sys-
tems models. Among others, David Witherington has argued that
a full understanding of living things entails seeing levels of orga-
nization and process as being complementary and indissociable
(e.g., Witherington, 2011; Witherington and Heying, 2013). He
makes the point that this stipulation pushes against the Gibsonian
emphasis that is apparent in certain flavors of dynamic systems
theory, for instance that of Thelen and Smith (1994). According
to Witherington (in press), embodiment could be productively
aligned with an approach more resembling Piagetian construc-
tivism (see also Witherington and Margett, 2011), a sentiment
that would be endorsed by those dynamical systems practitioners
who see constructivism as being fundamentally consistent with
systems approaches (e.g., van Geert, 2011).
RELATIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS
Here I wish to highlight the suggestion that a particular con-
structivist approach to embodiment, informed by specific lines
of systems thinking in developmental science and the philoso-
phy of biology, has a great deal of potential for informing the
understanding of different levels of analysis. This approach is
termed relational developmental systems (RDS), as put forward by
Willis Overton and Richard Lerner, who have suggested that it
has key implications for understanding the nature of levels and
the relations between them (Overton and Lerner, 2012; Overton,
2013). As the term suggests, RDS combines two broader metathe-
oretical streams: relationism and developmental systems. The
worldview of relationism rejects any simple notion of separable
causes, and can be contrasted with what Overton (2006) terms
a Cartesian worldview that encourages dichotomies, elevates the
explanatory value of proximate mechanisms, and precludes inte-
gration. Working under the umbrella of relationism allows these
constraints to be jettisoned and enables a move toward a more
integrative, developmentally oriented account of brain, body, and
mind.
At a finer grain of theory, RDS is further informed by the
developmental systems approach that emerged from a particular
strand of psychobiological research in the 20th century (Lehrman,
1953; Schneirla, 1959; Gottlieb, 1970) and which brings together
related viewpoints from developmental and evolutionary biol-
ogy (Oyama, 1985; Griffiths and Gray, 1994). While this strand
consists of various threads with different emphases (Johnston,
2010; Griffiths and Tabery, 2013), at its core are the notion of the
developmental system, the necessity of multiple modes of expla-
nation, and the stipulation that no single aspect of the system
can be elevated in terms of its causal role (Shea, 2011). In turn,
the developmental systems approach has its roots in principles
derived by embryologists in the mid-20th century (e.g., Spemann,
1938; Kuo, 1939) who documented how organismic development
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proceeds through a process of differentiation and integration.
This foundational notion went on to influence developmentalists
such as Werner (1948) and Piaget (1952) who laid the founda-
tions for a biologically-informed developmental science of life
and mind.
Drawing on the construct of the developmental system, RDS
embraces several forms of explanation and brings them together
in a relational framework. One key emphasis is on the impor-
tance of what can be called pattern explanation, or what Overton
(1991) labeled competence. In turn, the notion of competence is
similar to Aristotle’s notion of the formal cause, which is interre-
lated with, but different from, other types of explanation such as
efficient or material causes (Caston, 2006). It is important here to
emphasize the necessarily abstract quality of pattern explanation,
which transcends the framing of temporally related antecedents
and consequences that is usually associated with the notion of
causation. As such, pattern explanation refers to the structure or
organization of the endogenously active system. This abstraction
reflects the view that organization is not something that exists
over and above the parts of a system, yet at the same time allow-
ing organization more than a descriptive role. In this sense, the
notion of organization as constraint (Thompson, 2007; Deacon,
2012) is helpful. As framed by Witherington (in press):
“the explanatory causality of a system’s organization rests in its
top-down constraint. Constraint involves a lessening of variabil-
ity, a narrowing of degrees of freedom, and as such plays a critical
role in causal explanation by virtue of establishing limitations for
what kinds of bottom-up processes. . . are available to a given
system; thus, the nature of local interactions cannot be fully under-
stood divorced from the organizational whole in which these
interactions are embedded” (p. 90).
The necessity of relating multiple modes of explanation is central
to the RDS approach, in which pattern explanation provides the
meaning context for a different and complementary level of pro-
cesses, or what Overton (1991) labeled procedures. In referring to
distinct, observable factors having a casual action that precedes
a specific effect, processes (or what in Aristotelian terms would
be efficient causes) are quite close to everyday notions of causa-
tion. However, as discussed by Witherington (2011, in press), this
can too easily lead to a diminished role for structure and a denial
of the explanatory import of the formal patterns. According to
accounts that discount a causal role for pattern explanation, the
appearance of structure arises from the operation of complex
positive and negative feedback processes, but does not causally
influence the subsequent operation of those processes. However,
this neglects the fact that complex processes must be organized
in some way, and it is this issue that necessitates the formal
level of explanation, which becomes the system of a systems
approach. Simply put, it is a mistake to believe that pattern
explanations are rendered unnecessary if enough processes are
described. Adopting such a position would present a conundrum
that stretches far back in the history of philosophical and scien-
tific thought, which is that every efficient cause or mechanism
cannot be caused by another efficient cause or mechanism. In
contrast, from a relational viewpoint, form and process can be
seen as inextricably linked through the notion of circular causal-
ity (Witherington, 2011). Any living system acts according to its
particular organization, and that organization changes through
its activity.
Perhaps the most problematic manifestation of the neglect
of pattern explanation comes through a situation in which
processes—as properties of parts of a system—are conflated with
the properties of the whole system. In their critique of cogni-
tive neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker (2003) termed this the
mereological fallacy, such that an accumulation of neural mech-
anisms cannot stand in as a full explanation of the properties of
the individual person. Related instances of conflating subpersonal
processes with personal-level properties of the individual are a
widespread problem in many areas of contemporary psychology,
including developmental science (for discussion of one example,
see Rakoczy, 2012). Avoiding these pitfalls requires the under-
standing that processes at the procedural level must be organized
in some way, and that in and of themselves, processes or mech-
anisms have no context. It is this issue that brings the focus to
competence or formal explanation as a different level of analysis,
with the stipulation that this level provides a functional context
for a different, complementary level of processes.
Given the above, we canmove toward seeing the importance of
a dynamic pattern that entails an indissociable relation between
organization and activity. To use the terminology of Overton
(1991), if the level of procedures is understood as the active
processes through which competence comes into being, while
simultaneously the competence level serves as a context for orga-
nizing the procedural level, we can begin to understand how the
two levels operate in a complementary fashion. This allows arrival
at a relational frame in which the interleaving of pattern explana-
tion and the understanding of specific processes is appreciated as
being fundamental to the scientific enterprise (Overton, in press).
A relational perspective on the different levels of structure
and mechanism also brings considerations of change and trans-
formation to the fore (Overton, 1991), because the reciprocal
relations between the levels must be seen in the context of the
developmental process itself. From the viewpoint of RDS, the
dynamic tension between competence (pattern explanation or
system) and procedures (specific processes) becomes the basis of
an inherently developmental, constructivist perspective. As cir-
cular causation, the developmental process recognizes both the
emergence of form through process along with the constraining
(downward) influence of form on process (Witherington, 2011,
2014).
Through an awareness of circular causality, we can begin to
understand how the relational and inherently developmental ties
between levels provide an integrative foundation for the study of
brain, body, andmind. This understanding then allows us to chart
a course away from the fallow territory that psychology currently
occupies. The integration of the concept of the developmental sys-
tem with the relational worldview brings forth the importance
of considering “co-acting, co-developing processes functioning
according to the reciprocal causality entailed by complex pos-
itive and negative feedback loops” (Overton and Lerner, 2012,
p. 375). As such, the framework of RDS has been offered as an
integrative paradigm in which living organisms are understood as
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dynamic, adaptive, non-linear, self-organizing and self-regulating
systems (Lerner, 2006; Overton, 2013). From this perspective,
the notion of a system provides a formal explanation, with the
directional features of adaptation and self-organization constitut-
ing a final pattern explanation (Overton, 2010). RDS recognizes
the dynamic complexity of developmental processes and further
exposes the inadequacy of split approaches that emphasize sim-
ple interaction and the elevation of one level of analysis over
another.
In terms of applications of the relational framework, it is
important to recognize that RDS is a “mid-range” metatheory
that provides a set of core concepts that can inform more spe-
cific theories and guide empirical investigation (Overton, 2013).
Compatible approaches are those that reject split, mechanistic, or
reductionist tendencies and instead put an emphasis on under-
standing the ontogeny of the individual in the context of the
developmental system. One practical example of how this empha-
sis is realized comes from the family of empirical methods known
as person-centered approaches, which in contrast to variable-
centered analyses, focus on intraindividual variation rather than
on group means (Nesselroade and Molenaar, 2010; von Eye et al.,
in press).
Finally, if we consider how developmental processes can illu-
minate the relational ties between different levels, various fun-
damental questions arise. How can novel structures arise that
are different from the sum of their parts? How can activity at
one level of explanation account for change at a qualitatively dif-
ferent level? How can the result of “doing more of the same”
not simply be “more of the same”? From a much broader per-
spective, similar puzzles are at the center of the fundamental
philosophical problems of intentionality, consciousness, free will,
and agency. The underlying question running through these
problems involves the problem of relating a level of system or
meaning to a level of processes. The conventional approach of
isolating or splitting off one of these levels leads directly to the
brain-mind or mind-body problems, which are irresolvable when
viewed through the traditional lens of analytic philosophy and
an associated Cartesian-Split-Mechanistic framework. In moving
toward a more embodied framework, the integration provided by
relational developmental systems offers a transformation that is
based on the fundamental premise that levels ofmeaning and pro-
cesses should not be set against each other, but must be viewed
as an indissociable complementarity (Overton, 2006, 2010, 2013,
in press).
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